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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL ABDICATION: A PLEA FOR A
RETURN TO THE LOCHNER ERA SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
METHODOLOGY
BRANDON S. SWIDER*
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do
to them (without violating their rights).
-ROBERT NozICK 1
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps one of the most enduring controversies in constitutional law is
the debate over "judicial activism." Although specific definitions of this
phrase may vary, it is generally understood to refer to judicial interference
in the legislative process. 2 One of the most vocal critics of an "activist"
judiciary is Justice Antonin Scalia, who believes that judicial intervention
into matters that (according to him) belong solely to the legislatures is a
"threat to constitutional democracy."'3 Over the last few decades, however,
there has also been a movement in support of expanding the judiciary's role
with respect to the protection of individual rights and liberties.4 At the con-
stitutional level, this debate generally centers around the proper interpreta-
tion of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
5
Whereas jurists of Justice Scalia's persuasion favor a highly restrictive
interpretation of these clauses, advocates of a more expansive judicial role
tend to emphasize their original meaning at the time they were enacted.
This Comment addresses the constitutional protection of individual
rights and liberties within the context of Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach,
where the question before the court was whether terminally ill individuals
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2008; B.S., Finance, DePaul University, 2005. Mr.
Swider is an attorney and currently practices law in Chicago, Illinois.
1. ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974).
2. CLINT BOLICK, DAVID'S HAMMER: THE CASE FOR AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY ix (2007).
3. ANTONIN SCALIA & RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SCALIA V. EPSTEIN: Two VIEWS ON JUDICIAL
ACTIVISM 4 (1985).
4. See BOLICK, supra note 2, at x (stating that "the problem with judicial activism.., is not too
much of it but too little"); SCALIA & EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 10 ("1 [(Professor Richard Epstein)]
speak as an academic who would impose on sitting judges duties more extensive than they are often
willing to assume").
5. See infra Part It.
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had a constitutional right to access certain experimental pharmaceutical
drugs that had the potential to save their lives. 6 Part I of this Comment
discusses both the facts and outcome of the court's decision in Abigail A lli-
ance. In Part II, this Comment briefly tracks the history of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence with respect to the protection of individual rights and
liberties under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
("substantive due process"). Part III discusses a possible shift in the Court's
substantive due process methodology based on its decision in Lawrence v.
Texas.7 In Part IV, this Comment explains the shortcomings of the Court's
established substantive due process framework within the context of Abi-
gail Alliance. Finally, given these shortcomings, Part V suggests that the
court in Abigail Alliance should have reviewed the asserted right in ques-
tion under a Lawrence framework, which would likely have resulted in a
much different outcome.
I. ABIGAIL ALLIANCE V. ESCHENBACH
Abigail Alliance involved a suit against the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA) by Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs (the "Alliance"), a non-profit organization comprised of terminally
ill individuals who seek access to potentially life-saving drugs. 8 As a gen-
eral matter, however, the federal government restricts individual access to
newly developed pharmaceutical drugs.9 Through the FDA, the federal
government requires pharmaceutical companies to subject any new drugs to
a lengthy investigatory process before they can be sold to the public.' 0 The
FDA first requires pharmaceutical companies to file an application before
bringing the drug to market." 1 This application process can take an enor-
mous amount of time, given that "no drug may be approved without a find-
ing of 'substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or
is represented to have.""' 12 As a result, "application[s] must contain 'full
reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not
such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in use."'"' 3
Once the FDA approves the pharmaceutical company's application,
6. 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
7. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
8. 495 F.3d at 697.
9. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
10. See AbigailAlliance, 495 F.3d at 697-98.
I1. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
12. AbigailAlliance, 495 F.3d at 697 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5)).
13. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A)).
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the drug must undergo several phases of clinical testing. 14 Human subjects
are used for the first time in Phase I for the purpose of determining whether
the drug is safe enough for additional human testing.' 5 Phase II involves
testing of an increased number of human subjects.' 6 It is during this Phase
that the testing is supposed to reveal the drug's efficacy as well as any side
effects. 17 In Phase III, the testing involves hundreds or even thousands of
human subjects for the purpose of "gather[ing] ... additional information
about effectiveness and safety that is needed to evaluate the overall benefit-
risk relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician
labeling."18
The FDA generally restricts access to any drug that has not completed
this lengthy testing process, even where the individual seeking access suf-
fers from a terminal illness and has no other treatment options. Congress
has, however, created a few small exceptions to this general rule. In par-
ticular, the FDA may allow an individual who is suffering from a life-
threatening disease to access drugs that are still in clinical testing, where
that individual has no serious alternatives for treatment.19 The pharmaceu-
tical companies, however, may not profit from these particular transac-
tions.20 Finally, the FDA may deny terminally ill individuals access to
these drugs if there is "no 'reasonable basis' to conclude that the drug is
effective[,] ... or [if the drug poses an] 'unreasonable and significant addi-
tional risk of illness or injury."'
21
The Alliance found that this minor exception to the general rule was
insufficient to meet the needs of its terminally ill members. Specifically,
the Alliance asked the FDA to allow individuals to access experimental
drugs after the completion of Phase I testing. 22 The FDA denied this re-
quest, concluding that it "would upset the appropriate balance that it [(the
FDA)] is seeking to maintain, by giving almost total weight to the goal of
early availability and giving little recognition to the importance of market-
ing drugs with reasonable knowledge for patients and physicians of their
14. On average, this testing process takes up to seven years. See id. at 698.
15. See 21 C.F.R § 312.21(a) (2007).
16. See id. § 312.21(b).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 312.21(c).
19. See id. § 312.34(b)(l)(i)-(ii). Additionally, the drug must be "under investigation in a con-
trolled clinical trial," id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iii), and the drug's sponsor must be "actively pursuing market-
ing approval of the investigational drug with due diligence." Id. § 312.34(b)(1)(iv).
20. See id. § 312.7(d)(3). Drug companies may recover only those costs relating to "manufacture,
research, development, and handling of the investigational drug." Id.





likely clinical benefit and their toxicity. '23
Because of the FDA's blanket rejection of its proposal, the Alliance
sued the FDA, claiming that the lengthy investigation process for new
drugs "amount[ed] to a death sentence for... terminally ill patients. '24
Specifically, the Alliance claimed that the narrow exception to the general
rule prohibiting access to drugs still in clinical testing was not sufficient to
provide terminally ill individuals with the access they needed to help save
their lives. 25
After the district court rejected the proposition that individuals have a
right to access drugs not yet approved by the FDA,26 a divided Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed.27 Writing for the majority, Judge
Rogers found that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 28 guar-
antees terminally ill individuals the right to access potentially life-saving
drugs that have completed Phase I testing, where the terminally ill indi-
viduals have no viable alternative method of treatment. 29 Accordingly,
Judge Rogers remanded the case back to the district court for the determi-
nation of whether the FDA's general prohibition of access to these drugs
could pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny review (i.e., whether
the FDA's new-drug regulations were narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling government interest). 30
The rest of the D.C. Circuit, however, would have none of this. After
an en banc hearing, the court vacated Judge Rogers' opinion and held in-
stead that terminally ill individuals do not have a fundamental right to ac-




27. Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach (Abigail 1), 445 F.3d 470, 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006), reversed on
reh 'g 495 F.3d 695, 697 (en banc).
28. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment,
applied in this case because it was the federal government that allegedly infringed on the right asserted
by the Alliance. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies in cases where individuals
attack state action under a substantive due process theory. As a general matter, however, both clauses
provide the same procedural and substantive guarantees. The only difference is whether the challenged
government action originated at the state or federal level. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000) ("We have long recognized that the [Fourteenth] Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its
Fifth Amendment counterpart, guarantees more than fair process. [It] also includes a substantive com-
ponent that provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental
rights and liberty interests.") (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). For the remainder of this
Comment, any discussion of the protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment apply equally to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
29. Abigail 1, 445 F.3d at 486. In addition, Judge Rogers held that the access must be "informed,"
and that the terminally ill individual must be "mentally competent." Id.
30. Id.
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cess potentially life-saving drugs.31 In finding that no such fundamental
right exists, the court invoked the substantive due process framework estab-
lished in Washington v. Glucksberg.32 According to Glucksberg, when
courts are faced with the question whether the Due Process Clause of either
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment protects an asserted right or liberty
interest, they must consider (1) whether the right or liberty interest is, "ob-
jectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if [it was] sacrificed"; and (2) whether the asserted right or liberty
interest is stated with sufficient specificity.33 Assuming that the Alliance's
asserted right satisfied Glucksberg's second requirement, the court engaged
in a lengthy analysis of whether that right passed muster under the first
inquiry. 34 Upon an examination of the history and legal traditions of the
United States, the court found that the Alliance's asserted right for termi-
nally ill individuals to access experimental pharmaceutical drugs for the
purpose of saving their lives was not fundamental. 35 The court therefore
subjected the FDA's new-drug regulations merely to rational basis re-
view,36 and, as a result, found that they did in fact bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to a legitimate government interest.37 Accordingly, the court
upheld the constitutionality of the FDA's regulations.
38
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTY INTERESTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The entire history of the Supreme Court's protection of individual
rights and liberty interests under the Constitution is a lengthy one, and is
beyond the scope of this Comment. It is, however, generally recognized
that individual rights received heightened constitutional protection at the
federal level after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 When
31. Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
32. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
33. Id. at 720-21 (internal quotations omitted).
34. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 702-03. The court nonetheless expressed "serious doubt" as to
whether the Alliance's asserted right would in fact satisfy the second requirement. In particular, the
court found it "difficult to imagine how a right inextricably entangled with the details of shifting admin-
istrative regulations could be deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 702 n.6 (internal quotations omitted).
35. Id. at 703-11. For a closer analysis of the court's decision, see infra Part IV.
36. Id. at 712.
37. Id. at 712-13.
38. Id. at 713.
39. See generally RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
2009]
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discussing the constitutional protection of individual rights and liberty in-
terests under the Fourteenth Amendment, two specific provisions come into
play; namely, the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Due Process
Clause.40 Although the Court has found that both of these clauses contain
protections for substantive rights, the former has essentially been gutted of
its original meaning.41 Consequently, the Court has arguably expanded the
reach of the Due Process Clause to protect those substantive rights origi-
nally meant to be within the ambit of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
42
A. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." '43 There is
substantial evidence in support of the notion that the privileges and immu-
nities referenced in this Clause were meant to include, inter alia, the "civil
rights" specified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 44 The leading case dis-
cussing the content of the terms "privileges" and "immunities" before the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment is Corfield v. Coryell, where Jus-
tice Washington described them as:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other
state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or other-
wise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and
dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the
state ... 45
Justice Washington stated that "[t]hese, and many others which might
LIBERTY 192-223 (2004).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. See infra Part II.A.
42. See infra Part l.B.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
44. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 60-68. The "civil rights" guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of
1866 included the right "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property." Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat.
27 (1866). This Act applied to every citizen, regardless of race and color. Id.
45. 6 F.Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). See also Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1872) ("The first and the leading case on the [privileges and immunities of the
citizens] is that of Corfield v. Coryell...").
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be mentioned," are among the privileges and immunities secured to each
citizen of the United States.
46
Although the evidence seems clear that the purpose of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause was to provide federal protection against infringe-
ment of these rights by state legislation, the Supreme Court essentially
gutted the Clause of its original meaning in Slaughter-House Cases. The
action in Slaughter-House Cases arose after the Louisiana legislature con-
ferred a monopoly on the Slaughter-House Company for the purposes of
"conducting and carrying on the live-stock landing and slaughter-house
business. '47 The legislature further prohibited the slaughtering of animals
at any slaughterhouse other than those of the Slaughter-House Company. 48
Various butchers of the New Orleans area whose businesses were placed in
jeopardy by the establishment of this monopoly challenged the legislation
as a violation of their rights guaranteed to them by the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.49
Interpreting this Clause for the first time since the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court distinguished between state citizenship
and national citizenship. 50 It found that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, which refers only to the citizens of the United States, did not in fact
provide federal protection for individual rights against infringement by
state legislation. 51 Stated otherwise, the Fourteenth Amendment, according
to the Court, did not provide federal protection for those privileges and
immunities discussed by Justice Washington in Corfield.52 Instead, those
rights belonged to individuals as citizens of the several states; 53 as such,
they could be infringed upon by the states without any Fourteenth Amend-
ment violation.54 Consequently, the Court found that the monopoly granted
46. Corfield, 6 F.Cas. at 552 (emphasis added).
47. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 59.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 66.
50. Id. at 74.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 77-78.
53. Id. at 78.
54. Lest the Court leave the Privileges or Immunities Clause wholly devoid of any meaning, it
suggested a few protections guaranteed by this Clause. Specifically, among those privileges and immu-
nities guaranteed to individuals as citizens of the United States included the right "to come to the seat of
government to assert any claim [one may have against it], to transact any business [one] may have with
it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, [and] to engage in administering its functions." Id. at 79.
Additionally, the Privileges or Immunities Clause guaranteed citizens of the United States the right to
access seaports and to seek protection from the government when navigating the seas. Id. The Court in
Twining v. New Jersey elaborated on the rights guaranteed to citizens of the United States under the this
Clause. 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908) ("[A]mong the rights and privileges of National citizenship recognized
by this court are the right to pass freely from State to State; the right to petition Congress for a redress
2009]
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to the Slaughter-House Company by the Louisiana legislature did not vio-
late any rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 55 The decision in
Slaughterhouse Cases therefore effectively stripped the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of it original meaning.
B. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
With the Privileges or Immunities Clause essentially written out of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it was not entirely clear whether courts had the
ability to strike down legislation that infringed on individual rights and
liberties. The Supreme Court's decision in Slaughter-House Cases removed
the Fourteenth Amendment's primary vehicle for doing so. The Court
therefore had to look elsewhere if it was to retain any power to scrutinize
this type of legislation.
Accordingly, the Court began to invoke the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 56 to achieve the purpose originally attributed to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.57 The advantage of using the Due Process
Clause to protect individual rights and liberties is that the right to life, lib-
erty, and property are expressly guaranteed. The problem, however, is the
fact that the Due Process Clause seems to protect only procedural rights
(i.e. rights to fair process), as opposed to substantive rights. Hence the
negative implication that one's right to life, liberty, and property may be
taken away as long as she receives due process of law. 58
1. The Lochner Era's Protection of Individual Rights and Liberty
Interests Under the Due Process Clause
Despite this textual difficulty, the Supreme Court consistently used the
of grievances; the right to vote for National officers; the right to enter the public lands; the right to be
protected against violence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal; and the right to
inform the United States authorities of violation of its laws.") (internal citations omitted).
55. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) at 82-83. Although a more detailed analysis of the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is beyond the scope of this Comment, it seems
clear that the majority essentially wrote the Clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Justice Field
stated in his dissenting opinion, the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
"was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing," if it did not include, inter alia, the civil
rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. at 96-98 (Field, J., dissenting); see also
BARNETT, supra note 39, at 192-203 (arguing that the majority in Slaughter-House Cases gutted the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of its original meaning).
56. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 206.
58. Id.; see also Lawrence v. Texas., 539 U.S. 558, 592 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Fourteenth Amendment expressly allows States to deprive their citizens of 'liberty,' so long as 'due
process of law' is provided...") (emphasis in original).
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Due Process Clause after Slaughter-House Cases to strike down legislation
that it found violated individual rights and liberties. For example, the Court
used the Due Process Clause in Pierce v. Society of Sisters to strike down
an Oregon statute that required parents to send their children to public
schools.59 The Court found that not only did this statute violate the liberty
of parents to choose whether their children would receive a private or pub-
lic education, but that it also infringed on the property interests of the pri-
vate schools in Oregon, all of which would essentially be put out of
business as a result of the statute.60
Similarly, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court struck down a Nebraska
statute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages to students before
they graduated from the eighth grade.6' Upon finding that the statute vio-
lated the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 the Court
described that liberty as including not just:
[F]reedom from bodily restraint[,] but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and gener-
ally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.63
The Court's use of the Due Process Clause to strike down legislation
that unnecessarily infringed on individual rights and liberties is perhaps
best illustrated by Lochner v. New York, 64 a case which is disdained today
by most legal scholars.65 In Lochner, the Court struck down a New York
statute that mandated a maximum sixty-hour work-week for bakers.66
Though clothed as a health regulation, the Court found that the statute's
"real object and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor between
the master and his employees.., in a private business, not dangerous in
any degree to morals or in any real and substantial degree, to the health of
59. 268 U.S. 510, 530, 534-35 (1925). The statute included exemptions "for children who are not
normal, or who have completed the eighth grade, or who reside at considerable distances from any
public school, or whose parents hold special permits from the County Superintendent." Id. at 531.
60. Id. at 534-35.
61. 262 U.S. 390, 397, 403 (1923).
62. Id. at 399, 402.
63. Id. at 399.
64. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
65. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Apr. 17, 2005, at 46
("Today, the conventional wisdom among liberal and conservative legal thinkers alike is that Lochner
was decided incorrectly and that the court's embrace of judicial restraint on economic matters in 1937
was a triumph for democracy."); but see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN
CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 71, 73 (2003) (arguing that Lochner was correctly decided).
66. Id. at 46, 64.
2009]
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the employees. '67 Quite simply, upon applying a more searching analysis
than today's rational basis test,68 the Court found that the New York statute
violated the basic liberty of freedom of contract between an employee and
an employer, and therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 69
2. The Supreme Court's Retreat from the Lochner Era's Substantive Due
Process Jurisprudence
The story of how the great transformation of constitutional law took
place in the 1930s is beyond the scope of this Comment.70 In short, con-
temporary scholarship demonstrates that the unraveling of the Lochner
era71 jurisprudence with respect to the constitutional protection of individ-
ual rights and liberties began with President Herbert Hoover's appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court in the early 1930s. 72 Essentially, Hoover's
"appointees... softened the Court's constitutional objections to progres-
sive legislation, which had the effect of further undermining the coherence
of the Court's earlier restrictive doctrines. 73
67. Id. at 57, 64.
68. As a general matter, the Supreme Court applies an extremely limited form of judicial review to
legislation regulating economic activity (indeed, if any review at all). See Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might
be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.") (emphasis added).
69. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. Justice Holmes famously dissented in Lochner based on his view that"a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the
organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire." Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Accord-
ingly, Justice Holmes did not find convincing the free market-oriented opinion of the majority with
respect to freedom of contract. But Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner is confusing when read in con-
junction with his First Amendment jurisprudence. Specifically, Justice Holmes was a strong advocate of
the "marketplace of ideas" theory of free speech, which essentially holds that competition between
differing ideas in an unregulated market for speech is the most efficient path to the truth. See Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In Abrams, Justice Holmes stated:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by the free trade in ideas-that the best of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id.. It is hard to square Holmes' advocacy of markets for speech in Abrams with his rejection of markets
for labor in Lochner.
70. See generally, Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891, 1895 (1994) (arguing that
President Hoover and Roosevelt's appointments to the Court was a primary factor in the transformation
of constitutional law in the 1930s).
71. For the remainder of this Comment, I use "Lochner era" to refer to the period of time up to
1930s when the Court used the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to strike
down legislation that violated individual rights and liberties.
72. See Friedman, supra note 70, at 1900-03; see also Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's
Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in CATO SUPREME COURT REvIEW: 2002-2003 23-24
(James L. Swanson ed., 2003).
73. Bamett, supra note 72, at 23-24.
[Vol 84:1
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL ABDICATION
As the Lochner era justices gradually left the scene, the problem fac-
ing the Court during the time of this transformation was the question of
how to uphold the constitutionality of progressive legislation that regulated
the economic activity of individuals under the existing substantive due
process framework, which essentially placed the burden on the government
to justify certain infringements of individual liberty.74 As Professor Randy
Barnett makes clear, Justice Brandeis's majority opinion in O'Gorman &
Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.75 set the stage for the Court's
retreat from the Lochner era's substantive due process framework. 76 Of
particular importance was the following language from Justice Brandeis's
opinion:
The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope
of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that
the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.77
The significance of this language cannot be overstated. By establish-
ing that governmental legislation regulating economic activity was pre-
sumptively constitutional, the Court shifted the burden to individual
plaintiffs to offer reasons why the legislation should be considered a viola-
tion of due process.
Of course, the initial presumption of constitutionality as established by
Justice Brandeis in Hartford Fire did not mean that the Court automatically
turned a blind eye toward such legislation; it was a rebuttable presumption.
Indeed, just three years later the Court in Borden's Farm Products Co. v.
Baldwin made just this point: "[the presumption of constitutionality] is a
presumption of fact of the existence of factual conditions supporting the
legislation. As such, it is a rebuttable presumption. It is not a conclusive
presumption, or a rule of law which makes legislative action invulnerable
to constitutional assault. '78
The ability to rebut the presumption of constitutionality did not, how-
ever, remain intact. The Court's unraveling of the Lochner era substantive
due process jurisprudence was completed in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
which involved a challenge to the state of Washington's minimum wage
74. See supra Part 11.B.1.
75. 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
76. See BARNETr, supra note 39, at 225-26.
77. Id. at 225-26 (qu.-ting Hartford Fire, 282 U.S. at 257-58) (emphasis added).
78. 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934) (emphasis added).
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law for women and minors. 79 The Court took issue with the freedom of
contract guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. After noting that the language "freedom of contract" is nowhere
mentioned in the Constitution, the Court elaborated: "[l]iberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and
regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process. '' 80 In upholding the constitution-
ality of the minimum wage law, the Court seemed to completely abdicate
its power of judicial review. As the Court stated:
What can be closer to the public interest than the health of women and
their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching employers? And if
the protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of state
power, how can it be said that requirement of the payment of a minimum
wage... is not an admissible means to that end? 81
Based on this opinion, the Court seemed willing to uphold any state or
federal legislation that was an admissible means to an appropriate end.
Indeed, the Court in West Coast Hotel presumed that the evil at hand ex-
isted (apparently, below market wages), even in the absence of the slightest
factual record for support.82 Thus, the Court decided that it would no
longer require the government to offer any evidence from which to infer
that an evil at hand exists. These were purely legislative determinations,
and courts, according to West Coast Hotel, had no business interfering. The
doctrine of substantive due process as established in the Lochner era was,
therefore, completely written off the books.
3. Contemporary Treatment of Substantive Due Process and the
Protection of Individual Rights and Liberties Under the Constitution
The question remaining after West Coast Hotel was whether courts
had any power at all to review state and federal legislation that arguably
infringed on individual rights and liberties. The Supreme Court addressed
this issue in United States v. Carolene Products Co., which involved the
79. 300 U.S. 379, 386 (1937).
80. Id. at 391.
81. Id. at 398. This paternalistic reasoning is troubling, especially since "laws justified as protect-
ing women have been a central means of oppressing them." Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1005 (1984). In particular, labor regulations such as maximum
hour and minimum wage laws created specifically for women "helped create the sex segregated job
market, with the more lucrative positions reserved for men ... When women-only protective labor laws
were in force, employers could completely disqualify women from jobs by defining a job as requiring
overtime, night work, or heavy lifting. Maximum hour laws denied women higher paid overtime
work... These protective laws gave women the option of staying at home or taking employment in
lower paid, less desirable jobs." Id. at 959 n.14.
82. 300 U.S. at 399.
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question whether the Filled Milk Act passed by Congress violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 83 Specifically, the Filled Milk Act
prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of milk that was made with
any fat or oil other than milk fat. 84 Although the Act was clearly special
interest legislation that resulted in anticompetitive effects by favoring one
group of producers over another, 85 the Court reasserted that such economic
regulation is entitled to an essentially irrebuttable presumption of constitu-
tionality:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be pre-
sumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators. 86
With an irrebuttable presumption of constitutionality in place for eco-
nomic legislation, the Court needed to establish some doctrine by which it
could scrutinize state and federal laws, "lest [the presumption of constitu-
tionality] swallow the entire constitutional practice of judicial review. ' '87
The result was what is now known simply as the famous "Footnote
Four." 88 Specifically, the Court's dicta in the fourth footnote of Carolene
Products provides the basis for the modem treatment of the constitutional
protection of individual rights. 89 In Footnote Four, the Court allowed a
"narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments." 90 By allowing for
83. 304 U.S. 144, 145-47 (1938).
84. Id. at 145-46.
85. See generally, Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV.
397, 398-99 (1987) (arguing that the result of the Court's decision in Carolene Products to uphold the
constitutionality of the Filled Milk Act "was to expropriate the property of a lawful and beneficial
industry; to deprive working and poor people of a healthful, nutritious, and low-cost food; and to impair
the health of the nation's children by encouraging the use as baby food of a sweetened condensed milk
product that was 42% sugar").
86. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152. See also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
488 (1955) ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it. The day is gone when this Court uses the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought.").
87. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 229.
88. See Miller, supra note 85, at 397 ("United States v. Carolene Products Corporation [sic], as
any second year law student knows, contains perhaps the most renowned footnote in constitutional
history.").
89. BARNETT, supra note 39, at 230.
90. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The Court makes this assertion seemingly without
much thought, for the Ninth Amendment does not in fact contain a "specific prohibition." Rather, as it
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judicial review of only those rights explicitly mentioned in the Bill of
Rights (the "Footnote Four framework"), the Court in Carolene Products
took the first steps toward a fundamental/non-fundamental rights dichot-
omy that continues to this day under the Court's conception of constitu-
tional rights.91
The problem with the application of the Footnote Four framework was
illustrated in Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court struck down a Con-
necticut statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives. 92 Under the
Footnote Four framework, the Court clearly had no authority to strike down
the law, as nothing in the Bill of Rights expressly protects a fundamental
right (i.e. a right expressly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights) to use contra-
ceptives. The Court was therefore faced with at least the following four
options: (1) adhere strictly to the Footnote Four framework and uphold the
Connecticut statute; (2) invoke the Lochner era substantive due process
doctrine to strike down the statute; (3) use the Ninth Amendment to strike
down the statute; or (4) construe the Bill of Rights in a way that allows for
striking down the statute while at the same time upholding the Footnote
Four framework.
In his famous (perhaps infamous) opinion, Justice Douglas chose the
fourth option. Specifically, he construed a few provisions of the Bill of
Rights in a way to support a general right of privacy.93 For example, Doug-
las found that "the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is pro-
tected from governmental intrusion. '94 Additionally, Douglas invoked the
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments 95 as further support that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."'96 Accord-
ingly, Douglas found that the contraceptive law was unconstitutional be-
cause it violated this right of privacy.
97
Importantly, Justice Douglas understood that he was walking a tight
line-on the one hand, Footnote Four seemed to restrict the Court's ability
reads, "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dispar-
age others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Though the interpretation of the Ninth
Amendment is beyond the scope of this Comment, its language suggests a serious error by the Court to
assume that only those rights that are specifically enumerated deserve a higher level of scrutiny.
91. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 230.
92. 381 U.S. 479, 480, 485 (1965).
93. Id. at 483-86.
94. Id. at 483.
95. In particular, Justice Douglas referred to the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. Id.
at 484.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 485-86.
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to strike down such a repugnant law; on the other hand, striking down that
law as violative of individual rights would seem to revive the Lochner era
substantive due process jurisprudence. Indeed, Justice Douglas expressly
recognized this dilemma:
Coming to the merits, we are met with a wide range of questions that
implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Over-
tones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York should be our
guide. But we decline that invitation... We do not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that
touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. 98
In all likelihood, therefore, Justice Douglas's refusal to use the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down the Connecti-
cut statute was a result of his reluctance to use a methodology even re-
motely similar to the type found in the Lochner era. Thus, the right of
privacy emanating from a few provisions of the Bill of Rights was born.
For the purposes of this Comment, the most important contribution made
by Griswold is not the Court's ultimate holding that the contraceptive law
was unconstitutional, but rather the fact that for the first time since
Carolene Products the Court upheld a "fundamental" right-privacy-not
expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights. 99
Although Justice Douglas avoided the use of the Due Process Clause
in providing protection for a "fundamental" right not expressly mentioned
in the Bill of Rights, the Court in Roe v. Wade expressly stated that the
right of privacy is in fact included within the liberty guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause. 100 Subsequent cases have relied on this "fundamental
rights" methodology to find that the Due Process Clause also protects addi-
tional rights not expressly mentioned in the Constitution.101 Today, courts
invoke the two-pronged standard established in Washington v. Glucks-
berg-i.e. (1) whether the right is, "objectively, deeply rooted in this Na-
tion's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty";
and (2) whether the asserted right is stated with sufficient specificity-to
determine whether the right is sufficiently fundamental to receive constitu-
tional protection.
98. Id. at 481-82 (internal citations omitted).
99. BARNETr, supra note 39, at 232.
100. 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47,
879 (1992) (fundamental right to abortion); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89
(1977) (fundamental right to decide whether to bear children); Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(fundamental right to marriage).
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III. LA WRENCE V. TEXAS: A POSSIBLE SHIFT IN THE SUPREME COURT'S
TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES
Just as the methodology used in Griswold was more important than
the particular outcome, the Court's more recent decision in Lawrence v.
Texas102 is significant for similar reasons. In particular, Lawrence marks
yet another shift away from the strict Footnote Four framework established
in Carolene Products. Whether the methodology adopted in Lawrence will
be extended to future substantive due process cases is still up in the air.
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a
Texas statute that prohibited homosexual conduct, even between two con-
senting adults within the privacy of their own home. 103 The case arose after
two Texas police officers who were investigating a weapons charge entered
an apartment and found two men engaged in a sexual act. 104 The officers
arrested both men and charged them with "deviate sexual intercourse...
with a member of the same sex," in violation of the Texas statute. 105 At
issue before the Court was whether the statute violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 106 Standing in the Court's way to
finding the statute unconstitutional was Bowers v. Hardwick, which, de-
cided just seventeen years earlier, upheld the constitutionality of a state
anti-sodomy statute. 107
In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court overruled Bow-
ers and held that the Texas statute violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 108 The potentially transformative aspect of the
opinion lies in the Court's refusal to invoke Glucksberg's strict substantive
due process standard. Quite simply, the Court declined to consider whether
the right to engage in homosexual conduct is a fundamental right that is
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist
if [it was] sacrificed."'1 9 Instead, the Court simply discussed the "liberty"
102. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
103. Id. at 562-63.
104. Id. at 562-63.
105. Id. at 563.
106. Id. at 564.
107. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986). The Court in Bowers found that the anti-sodomy statute did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
108. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
109. 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations omitted). But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190 (stating
that the issue before the Court was "whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon
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protected under the Due Process Clause1 10 and placed the burden on the
state to justify this restriction of liberty."l Perhaps the most important
language in Lawrence comes at the end of the opinion, where Justice Ken-
nedy observed:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us
to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought nec-
essary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution en-
dures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own
search for greater freedom. 112
This type of language signals Justice Kennedy's understanding that
the Framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would not have pre-
sumed to know a priori the full range of liberties guaranteed to each indi-
vidual under the Due Process Clauses. In this way, Justice Kennedy's
reasoning bears a striking similarity to many of the Framers' view that
individual rights and liberties are incapable of enumeration. 11 3
The methodology in Lawrence of simply presuming that the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause guarantees individuals the right to
choose their own personal relationships free of government interference
brought the Court one step closer toward dissolving the Footnote Four
framework. In essence, Lawrence seemed to indicate that the Court was at
least open to the idea of returning to a more traditional substantive due
process methodology; namely, the type of methodology exemplified by the
homosexuals to engage in sodomy").
110. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564 (stating that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
has a substantive component that protects an individual's liberty).
11l. Id. at 571 ("The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce [its
own moral] views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.").
112. Id. at 578-79.
113. See BARNETT, supra note 39, at 56-57. Specifically, one of the members of the Constitutional
Convention, James Wilson, stated:
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated. A
bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt
an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence
is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the
government; and the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.
Id. at 56. Similarly, as future Supreme Court Justice James Irdell stated, "[I]et any one make what
collection or enumeration of ights he pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights
not contained in it." Id. at 57. Both of these statements were made in opposition to adding the Bill of
Rights to the Constitution. The argument was that such an enumeration of rights would necessarily
imply that all other claims to rights or liberties were sacrificed to the government. Accordingly, the
government would then be free to infringe on all other rights not specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution. Indeed, this was such a forceful argument that James Madison himself stated that "[t]his is one
of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into
this system." Id. at 224.
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Lochner era. Though it is unclear whether the Court will extend the reason-
ing and methodology of Lawrence to future constitutional rights cases,
Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach is a perfect example of a case that essen-
tially cries out for the Lochner era treatment.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE CURRENT SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
FRAMEWORK TO APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LIBERTY
INTEREST AT STAKE IN ABIGAIL ALLIANCE V. ESCHENBA CH
As stated above, the Supreme Court's current substantive due process
framework involves a two-fold inquiry for the determination of whether an
asserted right is fundamental. First, courts must consider whether the as-
serted right or liberty interest is, "objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed." ' 1 4 Second,
the asserted right or liberty interest must be stated with sufficient specific-
ity (the "specificity requirement"). 115 Although the first prong of this test is
certainly rife with problems, 1' 6 this Comment focuses on the propriety of
the specificity requirement. In particular, the flaws of the specificity re-
quirement are on clear display in Abigail Alliance. Perhaps no recent sub-
stantive due process case more clearly illustrates how this requirement
devalues the significance of the liberty at stake. Additionally, it is possible
even outside the context of the Abigail Alliance decision to see how the
specificity requirement will almost always lead courts to conclude that an
asserted right or liberty interest is not fundamental. Finally, the court's
stringent focus in Abigail Alliance on the specificity requirement blinds it
to perhaps the most significant argument in favor of the Alliance's asserted
right-namely, the textual anchor in the Due Process Clause of the right to
life.
114. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
115. Id. at 721.
116. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Although Michael H. was decided
before Glucksberg, Justice Scalia applied essentially the same language of the first prong of the Glucks-
berg formulation in holding that a natural father did not have any parental rights under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because his child was conceived as a result of an adulterous affair
that he had with a married woman. Id. at 113-14, 126-27. In so holding, Justice Scalia found it particu-
larly important (indeed, controlling) that there was no specific tradition in this Nation's history of
protecting the rights of parents who beget children outside the traditional unitary family. Id. at 124. See
also J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613,
1615-18 (1990) (criticizing Justice Scalia's view in Michael H. that protection of rights under the Due
Process Clause requires a specific, historical tradition).
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A. The Effect of the Specificity Requirement
In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy rightly recognized that a requirement of
a highly specific formulation of an asserted right can often fail "to appreci-
ate the extent of the liberty at stake." ' 1 7 Indeed, the statute at issue in Law-
rence actually punished individuals as criminals simply for engaging in
certain types of personal relationships 1' 8 that should have been within their
liberty to choose in the first place. The FDA's new-drug regulations share a
repugnant quality similar to the statute in Lawrence. In essence, the effect
of the FDA's restriction of access for terminally ill patients to potentially
life-saving drugs is, as the Alliance points out, a "death sentence," 119 and
the attempt by the majority in Abigail Alliance to state the asserted right
with such specificity fails to take into account the magnitude of the liberty
at stake. Nowhere in the majority's opinion does the court acknowledge the
severity of these individuals' life-threatening illnesses, even though the
Alliance made clear that they have no viable alternatives for treatment.1 20
Additionally, the court's relentless focus on Glucksberg's specificity
requirement causes it to formulate the right differently in separate instances
of the opinion. For example, the court initially states the Alliance's asserted
right as follows:
Whether the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause embraces the
right of a terminally ill patient with no remaining approved treatment op-
tions to decide, in consultation with his or her own doctor, whether to
seek access to investigational medications that the FDA concedes are
safe and promising enough for substantial human testing.
12 1
Yet later in its opinion, the court transforms this asserted right into one
about whether individuals have the right to assume "enormous risks.., in
pursuit of potentially life-saving drugs."'122 Notably, in neither of these
formulations does the court even once mention the significance of the lib-
erty interest sought by the Alliance members. That is, while the court
struggles to adhere to a strict interpretation of the specificity requirement,
the real issue is simple: whether terminally ill individuals have the right to
access certain medical treatments that could potentially save their lives.
Again, just as Justice Kennedy recognized in Lawrence, defining a right
117. See 539 U.S. at 566-67.
118. Id. at 563.
119. Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
120. Id. at699.
121. Id. at 701.
122. Id. at 710 (emphasis in original). Importantly, the court rephrases the asserted right to suit its
own argument that the doctrine of self-defense did not support the Alliance's position. See id. at 709-
10.
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with such specificity actually denigrates the liberty interest at stake.
In her dissent in Abigail Alliance, Judge Rogers also identifies the ma-
jority's error in adhering to a rigid interpretation of the specificity require-
ment. Although Rogers, like the majority, believes that the Glucksberg
framework is controlling, she does not make the mistake of concluding that
the specificity requirement prohibits courts from inferring a broader right to
the underlying asserted liberty interest. 123 Indeed, "were it impermissible to
draw any inferences from a broader right to a narrower right, nearly all of
the Supreme Court's substantive due process case law would be out of
bounds."' 124 Accordingly, Rogers points out that the real question is
whether the Constitution protects a fundamental right to preserve one's
life. 125 It is only after making this determination that the court should have
then discussed whether "the risks associated with [preserving one's life]
justify restraining that right."'126 In essence, according to Judge Rogers, the
majority completely turns this inquiry on its head. Rather than determining
whether a broad right to preserve one's life is fundamental, the court im-
mediately specified the right with the highest detail possible (which in-
cluded the risks associated with preserving one's life), and consequently
found that it did not qualify as fundamental. It is exactly this problem with
the specificity requirement that causes courts such difficulty in identifying
rights and liberty interests that do in fact qualify as fundamental.
In Raich v. Gonzales, for example, plaintiff Angel McClary Raich
sought a declaratory judgment that the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) 127
was unconstitutional as applied to her. 128 Specifically, Raich used medici-
nal marijuana to treat numerous serious illnesses, "including an inoperable
brain tumor, a seizure disorder, life-threatening weight loss, nausea, and
several chronic pain disorders."' 129 For Raich, marijuana was the only
treatment out of nearly three dozen options that adequately treated her
symptoms. 130 Every other available treatment option "utterly failed."' 13 1
123. Id. at 716 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting). For example, Judge Rogers cites Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), which inferred abortion rights from a right to privacy, and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977), which "extrapolate[ed a] specific right to determine extended family living arrangements
from [a] broader constitutional protection for the sanctity of the family." Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at
716 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).
127. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2006).
128. 500 F.3d 850, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2007).
129. Id. at 855.
130. Id.
131. Id. (intemal citation omitted).
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Raich thus claimed that the CSA violated her right to use marijuana
for medicinal purposes under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.132 Invoking Glucksberg's specificity requirement, the court analyzed
Raich's liberty interest as she framed it-namely, the right to "make life-
shaping medical decisions that are necessary to preserve the integrity of her
body, avoid intolerable physical pain, and preserve her life."' 133 Although
on its face this description seems reasonably specific, and in fact even mir-
rors fundamental rights that the Supreme Court has previously recog-
nized, 134 the court found that Raich's asserted right failed to meet the
specificity requirement because it omitted the word "marijuana." Accord-
ingly, the court found it necessary to reformulate Raich's asserted right into
"whether the liberty interest specially protected by the Due Process Clause
embraces a right to make a life-shaping decision on a physician's advice to
use medical marijuana to preserve bodily integrity, avoid intolerable pain,
and preserve life, when all other prescribed medications and remedies have
failed."'1 35 With the addition of the word "marijuana" included in the de-
scription, the court found that the right was not fundamental in part because
of the CSA, which did not allow for any exceptions to the prohibition of
controlled substances. 136
The important aspect of Raich is not the court's ultimate holding that
medicinal use of marijuana is not a fundamental right, but rather how the
court reached this decision. For example, before reformulating Raich's
asserted right to include the word "marijuana," the court seemed to indicate
the validity of Raich's liberty interest as she originally framed it. In particu-
lar, the court noted that Raich's asserted right to use available medicinal
treatments to avoid pain and preserve her life had considerable support
from the Supreme Court. 137 It was only after strictly adhering to Glucks-
berg's specificity requirement (just as the majority did in Abigail Alliance)
that the court deemed Raich's asserted right as non-fundamental. 138 For the
132. Id. at 856.
133. Id. at 864.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 865-66.
137. See id. at 864. Specifically, the court found that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) supported Raich's
right to use medicinal marijuana because of their emphasis on an individual's right to autonomy and
bodily integrity. Raich, 500 F.3d at 864.
138. See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997) (reformulating the asserted
"right to die" into "whether the 'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right
to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so") (emphasis added); Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277, 279 (1990) (reformulating the asserted "right to die" into
"a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition").
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purposes of this Comment, the overriding lesson of Raich is its illustration
of how Glucksberg's specificity requirement essentially forces courts to
formulate an asserted right or liberty interest in a way that can almost never
be considered "fundamental."'1 39
Logically, of course, it is easy to see that rights or liberty interests de-
scribed with such specificity will almost never be considered fundamental.
For example, few would question (with the possible exception of Justice
Scalia) a parent's constitutional right to send her children to a private
school. 140 Recall that the Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters
struck down the Oregon statute requiring parents to send their children to
public schools.' 41 The Court held that this statute violated the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 142
But what would happen if this was a new issue facing the courts to-
day? Presumably the specificity requirement would make all the difference
in the world. Consider, for example, a parent who asserted that she had the
right to send her children-whose names are Ozzie and Harriet; who de-
scend from German, Welsh, and Italian heritages; who are exactly three
years apart in age; where one prefers mathematics, the other literature-to
a non-religious, private school. With this level of specificity, it is difficult
to see how a court could find any such established tradition "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history" that would support a finding that this parent's as-
serted right was "fundamental." Had this level of specificity been required
in Pierce, the general right to send one's children to private schools might
not be protected today. 143 The point that this example makes clear is that
139. Despite its ruling, it is clear that the court at least recognized the magnitude of Raich's as-
serted liberty interest, as opposed to the majority in Abigail Alliance. See Raich, 500 F.3d at 859 n.6
("The seriousness of her conditions cannot be overemphasized .... Raich has shown remarkable forti-
tude in pursuing this action to vindicate the rights of the infirm despite her precarious physical condi-
tion.") (emphasis added); id. at 861 n.9 ("We cannot ignore that the unusual circumstances of this case
raise the danger of acute preconviction harms. The arrest of Raich or her suppliers, or the confiscation
of her medical marijuana would cause Raich severe physical trauma.").
140. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the legal founda-
tion of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
141. 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925).
142. Id. at 534-35. This case was, of course, decided in the Lochner era, where the Court was not
constrained in any way by a "specificity requirement." The only question relevant to the Court was
whether the statute simply violated the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause.
143. See also Balkin, supra note 116, at 1615. Balkin criticized Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) by pointing out that:
[U]nder his test, there has been no established tradition in California for protecting Justice
Scalia's own rights to visit his children, since there is no tradition of affording protection to
fathers who are children of Italian immigrants and who graduated from Ivy League law
schools before 1965, were appointed to the United States Supreme Court by former governors
of the state of California and have more than two children but less than thirteen.
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the specificity requirement always reduces the likelihood (to zero in many
cases) that asserted rights or liberty interests will be protected under the
Due Process Clauses of either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.
B. The Due Process Clause's Textual Anchor in the Right to Life and the
Common Law's Tradition ofRecognizing the Right to Preserve One 's Life
Even setting aside the arguments suggesting the impropriety of
Glucksberg's specificity requirement, the court in Abigail Alliance makes
an enormous error in its attempt to discover whether the Alliance's asserted
right is fundamental. Quite simply, the court overlooks the textual anchor
in both Due Process Clauses of the right to life.144 One might reasonably
ask whether this right to life has any meaning at all if it does not even pro-
tect the right to preserve or prolong one's own life. Seemingly blind to the
text of the Due Process Clause, the court argues that rather than this being a
case about the right to save one's life, it "is about the right to access ex-
perimental and unproven drugs in an attempt to save one's life."'145 Again,
the court's unwavering adherence to a strict interpretation of Glucksberg's
specificity requirement shields it from the real constitutional issue at stake.
As Judge Rogers makes clear in her dissent, the common law has al-
ways recognized an individual's right to save her own life. 146 Specifically,
the right of self-defense is deeply rooted in the common law,' 47 and al-
though it is generally applied in cases where one individual repels violence
from another individual, there is nothing about the doctrine that would
preclude its application to a "diseased cell within one's body."'148 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has already recognized on two separate occasions the
right of a mother to abort her fetus if the pregnancy threatens her life.
149
This right applies regardless of whether the fetus is viable. 150 Furthermore,
the Court has distinguished this particular right to abortion from the more
controversial, reproductive right to abortion. 151
Just as a woman may protect her life from a threatening fetus, why
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
145. Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 701 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
146. Id. at 717-19 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
147. Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1817-18 (2007).
148. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 718 (Rogers, J., dissenting). Notably, courts recognize the self-
defense doctrine even in cases where an individual uses violence to repel an animal attack. Id. at 718
n.3 (Rogers, J., dissenting); Volokh, supra note 147, at 1817.
149. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 163-64(1973).




should a terminally ill individual not also have the right to thwart a life-
threatening diseased cell? 152 Functionally, what is the difference between a
life-threatening fetus and a group of life-threatening cells? Indeed, "if peo-
ple may protect their lives even by taking a viable fetus's life or an at-
tacker's life, they should be equally free to risk their own short remaining
lives in trying to lengthen their lives."'1 53
In addition to the longstanding recognition of the right to self-defense,
the necessity doctrine at common law also supports an individual's right to
save her life from life-threatening diseased cells. For example, the court in
Raich v. Gonzales found that the necessity doctrine supported Raich's as-
serted right to use medicinal marijuana. 154 In general, necessity allows an
individual to violate a law if doing so is "the lesser of two evils."'155 For a
common law necessity defense to stand, courts require the individual to
show:
(1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2)
that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably antici-
pated a causal relation between his conduct and the harm to be avoided;
and (4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law. 156
The court in Raich found that all of these elements were satisfied. To
start, Raich easily met the first requirement, as she was clearly faced with a
choice of two evils: either violate the CSA and use marijuana to relieve her
pain, or abide by the CSA and "endure excruciating pain and possibly
death."' 157 Raich also satisfied the second element, as not even the Gov-
ernment contested the notion that she used marijuana to prevent imminent
harm to her body. 158 Additionally, Raich "clearly demonstrated the medical
correlation" between her use of marijuana and the harm she sought to
avoid, as the Government again did not make any argument in opposi-
tion. 159 Thus, the court found that Raich satisfied the third element. 160 Fi-
nally, because Raich and her doctor had exhausted all other legal
152. See also id. at 1828. ("why should a woman be free to use a gun to try killing an attacking
grizzly bear.., but not a drug to try killing an attacking bacterium or cell?").
153. Id. at 1829.
154. 500 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2007).
155. Id. at 858.
156. Id. at 859.
157. Id. at 858. As her doctor testified at trial, without using marijuana Raich would be forced to
"endure intolerable pain including severe chronic pain in her face and jaw muscles due to
temporomandibular joint dysfunction and bruxism, severe chronic pain and burning from fibromyalgia
that forces her to be flat on her back for days, excruciating pain from non-epileptic seizures, heavy
bleeding and severely painful menstrual periods due to a uterine fibroid tumor, and acute weight loss
resulting possibly in death due to a life-threatening wasting disorder." Id. at 859.




JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL ABDICATION
alternative treatments to her medical problems, the court found that she had
satisfied the remaining element.161
Taken together, the long history of the common law doctrines of self-
defense and necessity strongly support the notion that the Constitution's
explicit protection of the right to life includes the right to preserve one's
life. The majority's failure in Abigail Alliance to even recognize the textual
anchor for this right should thus cast serious doubt on the adequacy of its
decision.
In sum, by adhering to such a rigid interpretation of Glucksberg's
specificity requirement, the majority in Abigail Alliance failed to under-
stand the magnitude of the liberty interest at stake. This adherence even
shielded the court from taking notice of the Due Process Clause's protec-
tion of the right to life. Most importantly for the purposes of this Comment,
the two-pronged standard of Glucksberg that is on clear display in Abigail
Alliance illustrates how the current substantive due process framework
actually forces courts (in most cases) to abdicate entirely their constitu-
tional role of scrutinizing government legislation that infringes on individ-
ual rights and liberty interests, 162 which, unfortunately for the Alliance
members, means that "the right to try to save one's life is left out in the
cold." 163
V. APPLICATION OF THE LAWRENCE FRAMEWORK TO ABIGAIL ALLIANCE
Given the problems with both the propriety of the specificity require-
ment as well as its actual application to the Alliance's asserted right, the
court in Abigail Alliance should have used a Lawrence framework to re-
view the constitutionality of the FDA's new-drug regulations. Although
one could argue that Lawrence's methodology is limited solely to the issue
in that case, the Supreme Court has never disapproved of an extension of
Lawrence to other constitutional rights issues. Indeed, Justice Kennedy's
language in Lawrence provides ample support for courts to extend its rea-
soning to additional substantive due process cases. Recall that Justice Ken-
nedy made clear that a highly specific formulation of the asserted right or
liberty interest at stake often overlooks the importance of that right. 164 Per-
161. Id. Despite Raich's apparent satisfaction of each of these four elements, the court ultimately
found that, on procedural grounds, her necessity defense could not result in a prospective injunction to
enjoin the Government from enforcing the CSA against her. See id. at 861.
162. See Abigail Alliance v. Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Rogers, J.,
dissenting) ("To deny the constitutional importance of the right to life and to attempt to preserve life is
to move from judicial modesty to judicial abdication.").
163. Id. at 715 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
164. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 566-67 (2003).
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haps even more importantly, Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion with
the assertion that the Framers of the Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments could not have known in advance all of the
rights and liberties protected by these clauses. 165 In short, "[a]s the Consti-
tution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom."' 66
This language, at a minimum, suggests that Lawrence indicated a shift
in the Court's methodology for the protection of individual rights and liber-
ties under the Due Process Clauses. Thus, lower courts should not hesitate
to apply Lawrence's framework to future substantive due process cases,
especially when the right or liberty interest is as fundamental as the one
asserted by the Alliance-namely, the right to save one's own life.
With respect to the facts of Abigail Alliance, it is not surprising that
using the Lawrence framework to review the constitutionality of the FDA's
new-drug regulations would involve a much different analysis than the
highly rigid standard expounded in Glucksberg.
To start, the Alliance members would not be required to state their as-
serted right with a high degree of specificity. That is, the Alliance would
not need to frame the issue with the detailed precision required by the ma-
jority in Abigail Alliance.167 Instead, the relevant issue would simply be
whether the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment guaranteed an individual's right to save her own life. And,
importantly, the Lawrence framework would presume that individuals do in
fact have this right, and therefore would require the FDA to show that its
regulations were narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government
interest.
The likely result under a Lawrence framework would be a finding that
the FDA's new-drug regulations fail to survive strict scrutiny analysis.
Given the clear textual anchor of the right to life in the Due Process Clause,
coupled with the common law doctrines of self-defense and necessity, it is
hard to imagine a scenario where the FDA could in fact rebut the presump-
tion in favor of liberty. Most importantly, the application of the Lawrence
framework to the Alliance's asserted right would further dissolve the pre-
sumption of constitutionality and "fundamental rights" analysis in general.
In short, the extension of the Lawrence framework to additional substantive
due process cases would tip the balance back in favor of liberty, a disposi-
tion which has been seriously lacking since the Lochner era.
165. Id. at 578-79.
166. Id. at 579.
167. See supra Part IV.A.
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CONCLUSION
In closing, the Supreme Court's current substantive due process doc-
trine as formulated in Glucksberg is the result of decades of significant
misinterpretation of the Constitution with respect to the protection of indi-
vidual rights and liberties. The progressives appointed to the Court during
the late 1920s and 1930s began this misinterpretation by abandoning the
Lochner era's method of judicial review of legislation under the Due Proc-
ess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Instead of a pre-
sumption in favor of individual rights and liberty, the Court adopted a
rebuttable presumption of constitutionality. But even this intermediate level
of review did not last. With its decision in West Coast Hotel, the Court
essentially made the presumption of constitutionality irrebuttable. Then,
wholly out of thin air, the Court in Carolene Products allowed for a higher
level of judicial review only for those rights specifically enumerated within
the first ten amendments. 168
After two decades of the Carolene Products framework, Griswold set
the stage for a new era of constitutional rights jurisprudence. In violation of
a strict interpretation of Footnote Four, the Supreme Court recognized a
fundamental right to privacy nowhere expressly mentioned in the first ten
amendments. Instead, the Court found that this right to privacy emanated
from the penumbras of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus,
Griswold established the precedent by which courts are to protect only
those rights that they deem "fundamental."
The Supreme Court has also refined its treatment of substantive due
process since Griswold. Specifically, before courts can exact a higher level
of scrutiny of state and federal legislation, not only must the right asserted
be deeply rooted in this Nation's history, but it also must stated with suffi-
cient specificity. Combined, these two requirements make it all the more
likely that any asserted right or liberty interest will be considered non-
fundamental, and therefore subject merely to rational basis review.
It was not until Justice Kennedy's decision in Lawrence that the Court
breathed new life into the more traditional method of protecting individual
rights and liberties under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. Justice Kennedy correctly discarded the Court's entire
post-Lochner era method of judicial review of legislation under these
clauses. In particular, he understood that requiring asserted rights and lib-
168. See Roger Pilon, Foreward." Substance and Method at the Court, in CATO SUPREME COURT
REVIEW: 2002-2003 xi (James L. Swanson ed., 2003) (stating that the new constitutional rights meth-




erty interests to be stated with a high degree of specificity actually dimin-
ishes their importance. Additionally, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that,
in fact, it is essentially impossible to enumerate and define all of the rights
protected by the Due Process Clauses. Because of this problem, he simply
presumed that the liberty guaranteed by these clauses protected an individ-
ual's right to engage in personal relationships free from government inter-
ference. The onus, for once, was on the state to justify its infringement on
individual liberty. There was no discussion of whether this liberty interest
was a fundamental right. And, as the outcome of Lawrence demonstrates,
there was simply no need to engage in such analysis, as the true purpose of
the statute was to impose one particular view of morality onto an entire
people, some (or many) of whom might squarely reject it.
Based on Lawrence alone, the Court now has solid precedent on
which to retreat from the presumption of constitutionality. In future sub-
stantive due process cases, the Court is free simply to presume that individ-
ual liberty is guaranteed under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that the government must bear the burden of
overcoming this presumption by showing that the legislation in question is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
Despite the soundness of the Lawrence decision and its adherence to
the traditional substantive due process jurisprudence established in the
Lochner era, it is still unclear whether the Court would entertain extending
its reasoning to future substantive due process cases. Clearly, Justices
Scalia and Thomas would be unwilling to do so, given their scathing dis-
sent in the Lawrence decision. It is also important to note that the Court has
yet to apply the Lawrence framework to subsequent cases. This uncertainty
is unfortunate, as the Lawrence framework provides substantial hope not
only to those individuals in the future who are in "their own search for
greater freedom," but also to those individuals in the present such as the
Alliance members whose ability to preserve and prolong their lives literally
hinges on whether the promises of the Constitution allow them to do so.
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